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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did Petitioners reasonably interpret and rely 
upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(5) when they filed consolidated 
sales tax returns and disregarded intra-unit transfers of sand 
and gravel. The standard of review for this issue, which raises 
questions of statutory interpretation, legislative intent and 
construction of statutory language, is the correction of error 
standard and this Court need not give any deference to the 
Commission' s interpretation of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4)(d) (1988). See Savage Indus. , Inc. v. Utah Tax 
Comm' n, 811 P. 2d 664, 668-70 (Utah 1991); Bevans v. Industrial 
Comm' n. 790 P. 2d 573, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
(2) Did the Tax Commission erroneously interpret and 
apply Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 by assessing sales taxes solely 
upon erroneous accounting records which failed to recognize that 
Harper Contracting, Inc. , the alleged consumer of the gravel 
materials, actually owned all rights title and interest in the 
gravel materials. The standard of review for this issue, which 
raises questions of statutory interpretation, legislative intent 
and construction of statutory language, is the correction of 
error standard and this Court need not give any deference to the 
Commission' s interpretation of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
-1-
46b-16(4)(d) (1988). See Savage Indus. , Inc. v. Utah Tax 
Comm' n. 811 P. 2d 664, 668-70 (Utah 1991); Bevans v. Industrial 
Comm' n. 790 P. 2d 573, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Each person receiving any payment or 
consideration upon the sale of property or 
service subject to the tax under this 
chapter, or to whom such payment or 
consideration is payable (hereinafter called 
the vendor) is responsible for the 
collection of the amount of the tax imposed 
on the sale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(1) (1986). 
Each vendor shall, on or before the last 
day of the month next succeeding each 
calendar quarterly period, file with the 
commission a return for the preceding 
quarterly period. The return shall be 
accompanied by a remittance of the amount of 
tax required under this chapter to be 
collected by the vendor for the period 
covered by the return. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-5(4) (1986). 
(1) "Person" includes any individual, 
firm, copartnership, joint adventure, 
corporation, estate, or trust, or any group 
or combination acting as a unit and the 
plural as well as the singular number unless 
the intention to give a more limited meaning 
is disclosed by the context. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(1) (1986). 
"Vendor" means any person receiving any 
payment or consideration upon a sale of 
tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-
-2-
12-103(1), or to whom such payment or 
consideration is payable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(15) (1987). 
(1) There is levied a tax on the 
purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible 
personal property made within the state; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) (1987). 
"Retail sale" means any sale within the state of 
tangible personal property or any other taxable item 
or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), other than 
resale of such property, item, or service by a 
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(8)(a) (1987). 
"Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or 
barter, conditional or otherwise, in any manner, of 
tangible personal property or any other taxable item 
or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a 
consideration. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(10) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The issue before this Court is whether a Utah taxpayer 
can be forced to pay more than three-quarters of a million 
dollars in sales taxes when it reasonably relied upon the plain 
language of the tax statutes and when the assessment of sales 
taxes is based solely upon a bookkeeper' s erroneous accounting 
records which inaccurately reflect the transactions which they 
purport to record. 
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Nature of the Case 
This case arose when the Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission assessed nearly three-quarters of a million 
dollars against Petitioners for failing to remit taxes on the 
alleged sales of sand and gravel from Harper Excavating, Inc. to 
Harper Contracting, Inc. Petitioners disputed that any such 
taxes were owing. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
In 1989, the Utah State Tax Commission issued certain 
Preliminary Notices of assessment for audit periods ranging from 
October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1988. 
On October 26, 1990, Petitioners filed a Petition for 
Redetermination with the Utah State Tax Commission. The matter 
came on for hearing before the Commission on July 30, 1991. 
On January 9, 1992, the Commission issued its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision affirming the 
assessment of sales and use tax. 
Petitioners filed a Petition for Reconsideration of 
the Final Decision with the Tax Commission on May 4, 1992. 
The Tax Commission denied Petitioners' Petition for 
Reconsideration in an Order dated June 3, 1992. 
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of Agency 
Action with this Court on July 1, 1992. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Stipulation of Facts 
1. The parties stipulated to many of the pertinent 
facts in this case in a Stipulation of Facts filed with the Tax 
Commission on March 29, 1991, a copy of which is contained in 
the addendum as "Exhibit A." (R. 566-653) 
The Reorganization of Harper Excavating, Inc. 
2. Prior to 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. operated a 
business which included the excavation, cleaning and washing, 
hauling, and laying of sand, gravel, and other materials. (R. 
208; Transcript at 6, 79) 
3. In 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. discovered that 
it could not obtain sufficient liability insurance coverage for 
its business. (Transcript at 39-40, 45) Therefore, the 
decision was made to reorganize Harper Excavating, Inc. as a 
means of protecting the assets of the organization. (R. 568, 
645) 
4. On or about May 10, 1986, pursuant to a certain 
plan of reorganization, the assets of Harper Excavating, Inc. 
(the name of which was subsequently changed to Harper 
Investments, Inc. ) were divided and transferred to three wholly 
owned subsidiaries - Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. , Harper 
Investments, Inc. (the name of which was subsequently changed to 
Harper Excavating, Inc. ), and Harper Contracting, Inc. 
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(collectively referred to herein as the "subsidiaries"). 
(R. 208, 567) 
5. The name of Harper Excavating, Inc. , the Parent 
Corporation of the three subsidiaries, was changed to Harper 
Investments, Inc. (R. 208, 567) 
6. Rulon Harper was the president of Harper 
Excavating, Inc. before the reorganization, and became the 
president of each Petitioner after the reorganization. (R. 208-
0 9; Transcript at 20) 
7. Although the reorganization divided Harper 
Excavating into three subsidiaries and a parent company, the 
control and operations of the company did not change. The 
companies were presented to their customers as a single unit, 
bid jobs in the same manner, worked together to accomplish the 
goal of the affiliated group, were insured under a single policy 
and obtained a single bonding. (R. 646; Transcript at 23-25, 
56, 106, 108) 
The Accounting System for the Reorganized Companies 
8. The reorganization of Harper Excavating, Inc. 
necessitated a very complicated accounting system and required 
the redesigning of computer programs and accounting procedures 
for identifying revenue and expenses by job, by gravel pit, by 
labor, and by equipment. Because many jobs would cut across two 
or more of the operating corporations, income and expenses 
needed to be allocated based upon contributions of the various 
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corporations. Thus, income statements needed to be generated 
for the consolidated entity, including all four corporations, by 
each corporation, by job, by gravel pit, by equipment, and by 
material type. (R. 568, 645-46; Transcript at 45-48) 
9. The reorganization took place upon very short 
notice. Consequently, there was a very confusing period during 
which the computer programs were developed and the flow of 
information was accomplished. In several instances, procedures 
were begun and then modified or entirely changed as it became 
apparent that they were not working in the new organization. 
(R. 568, 645-46; Transcript at 51-52) 
10. The controller for Harper Excavating, Inc. prior 
to and during its reorganization was Steven C. Goddard. Goddard 
was solely responsible for creating the accounting system and 
procedures for the reorganized corporations. (R. 208, 645; 
Transcript at 43-46, 66-67, 78-79) 
11. In creating the accounting system and procedures 
for the reorganized corporations, Goddard allocated balance 
sheet assets and costs among the various subsidiaries in 
accordance with the function of each subsidiary as he understood 
those functions. For internal cost allocation purposes, Goddard 
assumed that the materials and costs associated with preparing 
the sand and gravel should be allocated to Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc., that assets and costs of hauling the materials 
should be allocated to Harper Excavating, Inc. , and that Harper 
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Contracting, Inc. should be allocated the assets and costs 
associated with installing the materials. He made the 
allocations of balance sheet assets without consulting Rulon 
Harper. (R. 208-09, 646-47; Transcript at 73-74, 77-78, 83) 
12. Rulon Harper did not concern himself with the 
accounting aspects of the reorganization. He understood that 
accounting transactions among the individual Petitioners were 
necessary for book keeping purposes but had no effect on the 
ultimate profit or losses of the companies as a unit. 
Therefore, he did not scrutinize the accounting policies and 
transactions instituted by the controllers for the Petitioners. 
(Transcript at 24-25, 37-38, 59-63, 108) 
The Gravel Sale Agreements 
13. On February 25, 1985, pursuant to certain Gravel 
Sale Agreements, Harper Excavating, Inc. purchased from Rulon 
Harper and other sellers all rights, title and interest in rock, 
sand, dirt, gravel and other materials located in a number of 
gravel pits. The agreements are contained in the addendum at 
"Exhibit A." (R. 208, 566, 572-83, 587-58, 602-12, 616-27, 631-
41) 
14. Beginning in 1985, Rulon Harper recognized the 
sale of sand and other pit materials as a sale of an interest in 
real estate on Schedule D on his personal income tax returns. 
(R. 567) 
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15. Contemporaneous with the reorganization, and 
pursuant to certain Assignments of Gravel Sale Agreement dated 
May 10, 1986 Harper Contracting, Inc. succeeded to the interest 
of Harper Excavating, Inc. as buyer under the Gravel Sale 
Agreements. The assignments are contained in the addendum at 
"Exhibit A." (R. 208, 567, 584-85, 599-6000, 613-14, 628-29, 
642-43) 
16. Prior to the reorganization, Goddard knew that 
the Harper Excavating, Inc. was paying Rulon Hairper and others 
for sand and gravel used in the company. However, Goddard was 
not aware of the Gravel Sale Agreements under which these 
transactions were accomplished and was never informed that the 
agreements were assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc. after the 
reorganization. (R. 646; Transcript at 48-49) 
17. The materials subject to the Gravel Sale 
Agreements were not carried as an asset on the books of Harper 
Excavating, Inc. prior to the reorganization and, therefore, 
Goddard did not specifically allocate interests in those 
materials to a specific subsidiary. However, consistent with 
his theory of accounting after the reorganization, Goddard 
mistakenly assigned the gravel pit materials to Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc. (R. 208-09, 646-47; Transcript at 48-50, 80-81, 
83, 85-86) 
18. Goddard did not consult anyone concerning the 
appropriate accounting procedure for handling sand and gravel 
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materials. Moreover, Goddard did not discuss this procedure 
with the owners and officers of any of the reorganized 
corporations. (R. 647; Transcript at 46-47, 79) 
19. Because Goddard had mistakenly assigned sand and 
gravel materials to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. , he assumed 
that sand and gravel would be purchased by Harper Excavating, 
Inc. and resold to Harper Contracting, Inc. All of his 
accounting procedures and records reflected this 
misunderstanding of the nature of the transactions which were 
occurring between the Petitioners. (R. 209) 
20. If Goddard had known that the Gravel Sale 
Agreements existed and became an asset of Harper Contracting, 
Inc. after the reorganization, he would have allocated those 
asset to Harper Contracting, Inc. and appropriately accounted 
for the transfers of sand and gravel among the Petitioners. 
(Transcript at 50-51, 57-58) 
21. Rulon Harper was unaware that Goddard had 
assigned the sand and gravel materials to Harper Sand and 
Gravel, Inc. and was also unaware that purchasing and accounting 
procedures did not reflect the true and correct ownership of the 
sand and gravel. (R. 209) 
Petitioners7 Post Reorganization Taxes 
22. After the reorganization, Goddard researched the 
provisions of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act to determine 
appropriate tax and filing procedures for Petitioners. He 
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concluded that, since Petitioners continued to operate in the 
same manner as before the reorganization, they were a "group or 
combination acting as a unit," and, therefore, a single "Person" 
within the meaning of former section 59-15-2(1) of the Utah 
Sales and Use Tax Act. Consequently, Goddard filed consolidated 
tax returns and did not treat intra-unit transfers as taxable 
sales. Goddard also received telephone confirmation from the 
Tax Commission regarding the accuracy of those conclusions. 
(R. 646; Transcript at 52-55, 95) 
23. In October of 1987, Steven Karsten became the 
controller for Petitioners. After observing the records and 
actual operations of Petitioners, he concurred with the former 
controller' s determinations regarding the taxability of 
intercompany transactions and continued to file consolidated tax 
returns. (Transcript at 96-99, 101-102) 
24. After the reorganization, Petitioners hired an 
independent CPA firm to perform audits and create consolidated 
financial statements. Those statements were based on Goddard' s 
accounting journals and were used by the CPA firm to prepare the 
Petitioners' consolidated income and sales tax returns. 
(Transcript at 67-68, 112) 
25. Petitioners filed consolidated sales tax returns 
and consolidated income tax returns for 1986 through September 
of 1988. During that time the Tax Commission never told 
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Petitioners that they could not file consolidated sales tax 
returns. (Transcript at 55, 98-99) 
The Tax Commission Audit 
26. In the later part of 1988, Respondent conducted 
an audit of Petitioners financial statements. The auditors 
relied solely upon the records and financial statements given to 
them by the Petitioners' controller which did not include the 
sand and gravel agreements. (R. 569; Transcript at 141-42) 
27. In 1989, the Utah State Tax Commission issued 
certain Preliminary Notices for audit periods ranging from 
October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1988. The Auditing Division of 
the Tax Commission assessed nearly three-quarters of a million 
dollars of tax and interest against Harper Excavating, Inc. for 
the alleged sales of sand, gravel and other materials from 
Harper Excavating, Inc. to Harper Contracting, Inc. during the 
audit period. (R. 209-10, 315-370) 
Petitioners7 Restated Financial Statements 
28. Petitioners' independent CPA firm was informed 
about the accounting errors with respect to the sand and gravel 
sales. As a result of this information, the CPA firm revised 
its audit of Petitioners and restated the financial statements 
to accurately reflect the true ownership of the sand and gravel 
and to accurately reflect the true nature of the transactions 
between Petitioners. Those restated financial statements were 
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admitted as part of the record before the Tax Commission. 
(Transcript at 83-84, 121-23; Exhibit 12) 
29. The restated financial statements and current 
accounting documents show that Harper Contracting, Inc. owns the 
Gravel Sale Agreements. The documents reflect that Harper 
Contracting, Inc. pays Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. a fee to 
process the sand and gravel. Harper Contracting, Inc. then pays 
Harper Excavating, Inc. a fee to transport its sand and gravel 
to the job site. Harper Contracting, Inc. collects and remits 
sales tax for ultimate sales to the consumer. (Transcript at 
117-18) 
Petitioners7 Post Audit Tax Assessments 
30. Petitioners accounting records for 1/1/89 to 
9/30/91, were audited by Respondent at the end of 1991. That 
audit did not result in any sales tax assessments for the sand 
and gravel transactions between Petitioners which are now 
accurately recorded in Petitioners' accounting records. (R. 26) 
Proceedings Before The Tax Commission 
31. On October 26, 1990, Petitioners filed a Petition 
for Redetermination with the Utah State Tax Commission. (R. 
669-83) 
32. The issues for the Tax Commission to determine 
were set forth in the Prehearing Order dated February 19, 1991, 
contained in the addendum as "Exhibit B. " (R. 657-60) 
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33. The matter came on for hearing before the 
Commission on July 30, 1991. (Transcript) 
34. At the hearing, Burt Ashcroft, Respondent' s only 
witness, acknowledged that a company cannot sell an asset which 
it does not own. (Transcript at 141) 
35. Burt Ashcroft also stated that he would have to 
evaluate and re-examine the Petitioners' restated financial 
statements in light of the assigned Gravel Sale Agreements in 
order to determine whether or not his position would change with 
regard to the sales taxes imposed. (Transcript at 144) 
36. On January 9, 1992, the Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision 
affirming the assessment of sales and use tax, contained in the 
addendum as "Exhibit C. » (R. 207-14) 
37. Petitioners filed a Petition for Reconsideration 
of the Final Decision with the Tax Commission on May 4, 1992. 
(R. 11-19) 
38. The Tax Commission denied Petitioners' Petition 
for Reconsideration in an Order dated June 3, 1992 on the basis 
that "Petitioner presents no new or additional facts or 
arguments that were not previously presented [and] considered 
. . . " A copy of the Commission' s Order is contained in the 
Addendum as "Exhibit D. " (R. 8-10) 
39. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of Agency 
Action with this Court on July 1, 1992. (R. 2-4) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioners analyzed the provisions of the Utah Sales 
and Use Tax Act and reasonably concluded that they were a "group 
or combination acting as a unit" within the meaning of the Act. 
Therefore, they filed consolidated sales tax returns and did not 
pay taxes on intra-unit transactions. The Tax Commission 
concluded, however, that although Petitioners are a unit for 
purposes of filing consolidated sales tax returns, they are not 
a unit when it comes to payment of sales tax on intra-unit 
transactions. Unlike the decision of the Tax Commission, 
Petitioners' interpretation of the Act is reasonable, logical 
and consistent. Petitioners should not be penalized because 
they acted upon their reasonable interpretation of the Act. 
Consequently, this Court should reverse the decision of the Tax 
Commission and order the Commission to refund the monies paid 
under protest by Petitioners plus interest which has accrued on 
that amount. 
The Court need not address Petitioners7 second 
argument unless it fails to rule in favor of Petitioners on 
their first argument. Even then, the Court must reverse the 
decision of the Tax Commission because that decision fails to 
recognize and assess taxes according to the realities in this 
case. It is undisputed that Harper Contracting, Inc. owned the 
sand and gravel which Harper Excavating, Inc. purportedly sold 
-15-
to it. Therefore, the transactions which occurred between 
those Petitioners could not have been sales within the meaning 
of the Act and Petitioners' accounting records which 
mischaracterized those transactions as sales were erroneous. 
The Tax Commission should have relied upon the substance of the 
transactions as disclosed by the actual facts rather than upon 
form of the transactions as disclosed by Petitioners' inaccurate 
and erroneous recording of those facts. Therefore, the Court 
must reverse the decision of the Tax Commission and order the 
Commission to refund the monies paid under protest by 
Petitioners plus interest which has accrued on that amount. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. Petitioners Reasonably Interpreted and Relied 
Upon S 59-15-2(1) of the Utah Sales And Use Tax 
Act and, Therefore, Are Not Required To Pav Sales 
Tax On Intra-Unit Transactions. 
In 1986, Harper Excavating, Inc. , the predecessor to 
Petitioners, discovered that it was unable to obtain sufficient 
liability insurance for its business activities. (Transcript at 
39-40, 45) Consequently, the decision was made to reorganize 
the business into smaller units to attempt to segregate risks 
and to protect some of the assets of the business in the event 
of a disaster. (R. 568, 645; Transcript at 45) Steven Goddard, 
the controller for Harper Excavating, Inc. , was solely 
responsible for setting up the accounting procedures and systems 
for the reorganized business. (R. 208, 645; Transcript at 43-
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46, 66-67, 78-79) During the reorganization, Goddard became 
concerned about the appropriate tax treatment for the 
reorganized business. To resolve his concerns, Goddard 
consulted the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. (R. 646; Transcript 
at 52-55, 95) 
Goddard discovered that, with respect to the 
collection of sales taxes, the 1986 Sales and Use Tax Act 
provided as follows: "Each person receiving any payment or 
consideration upon the sale of property or service subject to 
the tax under this chapter . . . is responsible for the 
collection of the amount of the tax imposed on the sale. " Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-15-5(1) (1986) (emphasis added).1 With respect 
to the filing and payment of sales tax returns, Goddard was 
instructed that "each vendor . . . shall file with the 
commission a return for the preceding quarterly period. The 
return shall be accompanied by a remittance of the amount of tax 
required under this chapter to be collected by the vendor for 
the period covered by the return." § 59-15-5(4). 2 
1
 In 1987, former section 59-15-5(1) was amended and 
recodified. From 1987-1990, the Sales and Use Tax Act stated: 
11
 Each vendor is responsible for the collection of the sales or use 
tax imposed under this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(1) 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
2
 Subsequent to the 198 7 amendment, the Act provided that 
" each vendor . . . shall file with the commission a return for the 
preceding quarterly period. The return shall be accompanied by a 
remittance of the amount of tax required under this chapter to be 
collected or paid for the period covered by the return. " Utah 
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Goddard then looked to the Act for clarification of 
the terms and phrases used in the foregoing statutory 
provisions. Prior to the 1987 amendment, the Act defined the 
term "person" as follows: 
(1) " Pers on" i ncludes any i ndi vi dual, 
firm, copartnership, joint adventure, 
corporation, estate, or trust, or any group 
or combination acting as a unit and the 
plural as well as the singular number unless 
the intention to give a more limited meaning 
is disclosed by the context. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(1) (1986) (emphasis added).3 Prior 
to 1987, the Sales and Use Tax Act did not define the term 
"vendor." However, in 1987 the following definition was added 
to the Act: 
(15) "Vendor" means any person receiving 
any payment or consideration upon a sale of 
tangible personal property or any other 
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-
Code Ann. § 59-12-107(8) (1987) (emphasis added). 
3
 Since its amendment in 1987, the Act has defined 
"person" as follows: 
(5) "Person" includes any individual, 
firm, partnership, joint venture, 
association, corporation, estate, trust, 
business trust, receiver, syndicate, this 
state, any county, city, municipality, 
district, or other local governmental entity 
of the state, or any group or combination 
acting as a unit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(5) (1987) (emphasis added). 
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12-103(1), or to whom such payment or 
consideration is payable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(15) (1987) (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, the Act has never explained or defined the phrase 
"group or combination acting as a unit" or any of the individual 
words making up that phrase. 
Goddard compared the foregoing tax provisions and 
accompanying definitions with the following undisputed facts of 
the reorganization. (Transcript at 52-55) Prior to its 
reorganization, Harper Excavating, Inc. had been in the business 
of excavating, cleaning and washing, hauling, and laying of 
sand, gravel, and other materials for third parties. (R. 208) 
After its reorganization, the business, as reorganized, 
continued under common ownership and control. Though the 
reorganization distributed assets, income and expenses among the 
various Petitioners for accounting purposes, the day to day 
operations of the business continued exactly as it had done 
prior to the reorganization. The Petitioners presented 
themselves to the public as a unit, typically bid jobs as a 
unit, and were each dependent upon the other for their 
continuing operation. (R. 646; Transcript at 23-25, 56, 106) 
Petitioners prepared consolidated financial statements which 
were necessary to win government contracts and to obtain 
bonding. (Transcript at 34, 104) Petitioners were insured as a 
unit under a single insurance policy and obtained a single 
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bonding. (Transcript at 34, 56, 108) And finally, Goddard was 
appropriately filing consolidated state and federal income tax 
returns on behalf of the Petitioners. (R. 646; Transcript at 
55) 
Based upon the provisions of the Utah Sales and Use 
Tax Act and the facts of the reorganization, Goddard reasonably 
concluded that Petitioners were a "group or combination acting 
as a unit" within the clear language of the Act. He confirmed 
those conclusions in a telephone conversation with someone at 
the Tax Commission. (Transcript at 54-55, 95) Pursuant to 
former § 59-15-5(4), Goddard filed consolidated sales tax 
returns on behalf of the Petitioners as a unit. Based upon 
former sections 59-15-5(1) and 59-15-5(4), Goddard continued to 
collect and pay taxes on sales from the unit to its customers. 
He did not collect and remit taxes on intra-unit transactions 
because, as a "person" within the meaning of the Act, the unit 
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obviously could not sell and purchase from itself.4 (R. 646; 
Transcript at 52-55, 95) 
Steven Karsten took over as controller of Petitioners 
in 1987. He assessed the accounting procedures previously 
followed by Goddard and concurred with Goddard' s sales tax 
treatment for Petitioners. Therefore, Karsten continued the 
practices established by Goddard. (Transcript at 96-99, 101-
4
 In its Final Decision, the Tax Commission makes the 
following statement: 
It is interesting to note that the parties 
agree that had the interests in the gravel 
pit in fact been assigned to Harper Sand and 
Gravel as believed, then without question, a 
taxable transaction would have arisen between 
Harper Excavating and Harper Contracting. 
Since this was indeed the belief that the 
Petitioner' s controller was acting under, 
sales tax should have been collected and 
remitted throughout the audit period. This, 
however, was not done and no explanation was 
offered why it was not. 
(R. 211) This statement of the Commission is incorrect for at 
least three reasons. First, nowhere in their arguments to the Tax 
Commission did Petitioners conceded that taxes would have been 
owed to the state if the Gravel Sale Agreements had been assigned 
to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. Second, it is untrue that 
Petitioners' controller was acting under this belief. Goddard was 
unaware of the actual existence of the Gravel Sale Agreements, let 
alone the fact that they had been assigned to Harper Contracting, 
Inc. (Transcript at 48-49) Finally, a very poignant explanation 
was provided to the Tax Commission for the decision not to pay 
sales tax. Petitioners always considered themselves to be a 
"group or combination acting as a unit" within the clear meaning 
of the Utah Sales and Tax Act. As a "person" within the meaning 
of the Act, intra-unit sales were not taxable. Therefore, even if 
Harper Sand and Gravel had been the actual owner of the sand and 
gravel, no sales taxes would have been owed to the state. 
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102) An independent CPA firm which audited the books of 
Petitioners during the audit period and prepared Petitioners' 
consolidated tax returns also concurred with Goddard' s 
assessment of the tax provisions. (Transcript at 67-68) 
Moreover, for three years prior to the audit, the Tax Commission 
itself never complained about Petitioners tax treatment which 
always included the filing of consolidated income and sales tax 
returns. (Transcript at 55, 98-99) 
It is well settled in Utah that "statutes imposing 
taxes and prescribing tax procedures should generally be 
construed favorably to the taxpayer and strictly against the 
taxing authority." Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockavne, 
22 Utah 2d 172, 450 P. 2d 97, 99 (1969). Moreover, when the 
meaning of a tax statute is uncertain, courts should resolve 
those doubts in favor of the taxpayer. Oaden Union Ry. and 
Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm' n, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P. 2d 57, 61 
(1964). This Court recently affirmed its practice "to construe 
taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it 
to the legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive 
if such intent exists." Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm' n, 
779 P. 2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
The Petitioners in this case reasonably interpreted 
and relied upon the language of the Act. As this Court has 
recognized, "[t]he terms of a statute should be interpreted in 
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accord with usually accepted meanings. In construing 
legislative enactments, the reviewer assumes that each term in 
the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are 
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused 
or inoperable. " Savage Indus, v. State Tax Comm' n, 811 P. 2d 
664, 670 (Utah 1991). Goddard followed this procedure. He 
examined the provisions of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act and 
concluded that Petitioners were a "group or combination acting 
as a unit" within the plain meaning of the Act. Consequently, 
he filed consolidated sales tax returns and disregard intra-unit 
transactions for purposes of sales tax. Others concurred with 
Goddard7 s conclusions. 
The Tax Commission, however, concluded that 
Petitioners were required to pay sales tax on intra-unit 
transactions. The Commission disputed none of the evidence 
which demonstrated that Petitioners were a "group or combination 
acting as a unit," but nevertheless, held that because Harper 
Excavating, Inc. reorganized into four separate corporations, 
though for reasons wholly unrelated to tax, they were not a unit 
for payment of sales tax. The Final Decision of the Tax 
Commission ignores the plain language of former section 59-15-
2(1) and current section 59-12-102(5) and gives contradictory 
messages to taxpayers who must interpret the Act. 
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It is imperative to note that, with respect to some 
aspects of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act, the Commission 
conceded that Petitioners are in fact a "group or combination 
acting as a unit" within the meaning of the Act. To illustrate 
this fact, the Commission' s Prehearing Order identified the 
following as an issue for the hearing: 
A. Were Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc., 
Harper Excavating, Inc. , Harper Contracting, 
Inc. , and Harper Investments, Inc. 
collectively a "person" as that term is 
defined in former Section 59-15-2(1) and new 
Section 59-12-102(5) of the Utah Code 
Annotated because they were a "group or 
combination acting as a unit" and therefore 
entitled to file a consolidated return? 
(R. 657-58) Curiously, the Commission answered this question 
with the following statement: "While the Petitioner mav indeed 
have filed a consolidated sales tax return, it should have 
reported the transactions between Harper Excavating and Harper 
Contracting." (R. 212) (emphasis added) This statement is 
incongruous. On the one hand, the Tax Commission is conceding 
that Petitioners are a unit for purposes of filing a 
consolidated sales tax return. In the same breath, however, the 
Commission refuses to recognize Petitioners as a unit for the 
payment of sales tax. The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act makes no 
distinction between "a unit" for filing of returns and "a unit" 
for payment of sales tax and the Commission provides no 
explanation for its distinction. 
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Petitioners' interpretation of the Act gives meaning 
and consistency to the "group or combination acting as a unit" 
language of the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act. The decision of the 
Tax Commission ignores this language and provides contradictory 
messages to tax payers who ultimately must interpret and apply 
the Act. Because of that decision, Petitioners were required to 
pay over five hundred thousand dollars in back taxes and over 
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars in interest. As 
predicted in the hearing before the Tax Commission, the payment 
of these sums has been extremely damaging to Petitioners current 
operations. (Transcript at 108-09) This Court should liberally 
construe the statute in favor of Petitioners, reverse the 
decision of the Tax Commission, and let the legislature clarify 
the meaning of the statute if, in fact, Petitioners' 
interpretation of the act was incorrect. Salt Lake County, 779 
P. 2d at 1132. 
II. Even Assuming Intra-Unit Sales Could Be Taxed, No 
Sales Occurred In This Case. 
If the Court finds that Petitioners' reasonably 
interpreted and relied upon the language of the Sales and Use 
Tax Act, it need not decide this second issue in the case. 
However, if the Court concludes that Petitioners were not 
reasonable in their interpretation of the Act, the Court should, 
nevertheless, reverse the decision of the Tax Commission because 
the Commission disregarded the facts of the case and affirmed 
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the sales taxes solely upon Petitioners' controller' s erroneous 
accounting procedures. 
The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act provides: "There is 
levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
. . . retail sales of tangible personal property made within the 
state." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1987) (emphasis added). 5 
The Act defines "Retail sale" as "any sale within the state of 
tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service 
. . . by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer. " § 59-
12-102(8)(a).6 The act defines "sale" in pertinent part to 
mean "any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, conditional or 
otherwise, in any manner, of tangible personal property or any 
other taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for 
a consideration." § 59-12-102(10).7 
The Sales and Use Tax Act was amended and recodified in 
1987. Prior to that time, the Act provided: "There is levied and 
there shall be collected and paid . . . a tax upon every retail 
sale of tangible personal property made within the state of Utah. " 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4 (1986) (emphasis added). 
6
 Prior to 1987, the Act provided: "xRetail sale' means 
every sale within the state of Utah by a retailer or wholesaler to 
a user or consumer." Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(6) (1986). 
7
 Prior to its amendment in 1987, the Act provided as 
follows: 
(2) "Sale" or "Sales" includes 
installment and credit sales, every closed 
transaction constituting a sale, and also 
includes the sale of electrical energy, gas, 
services or entertainment taxable under the 
terms of this act. A transaction whereby the 
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Under the authority of the foregoing statutory 
provisions, Respondent assessed nearly three quarters of one 
million dollars against Petitioners for unpaid sales taxes. The 
taxes were based solely upon the book entry sales of sand and 
gravel from Harper Excavating, Inc. to Harper Contracting, Inc. 
(R. 569; Transcript at 141-42) The Commission affirmed this 
assessment without regard to the underlying facts upon which 
those records were supposed to be based. 
The facts underlying the alleged sand and gravel sales 
are not disputed. In February of 1985, Harper Excavating, Inc. 
executed Gravel Sale Agreements with Rulon Harper, the president 
of Harper Excavating, Inc. Pursuant to those agreements, Harper 
Excavating, Inc. purchased all rights title and interest to 
certain materials located in several gravel pits owned by Rulon 
Harper. (R. 208) When Harper Excavating, Inc. reorganized, its 
Gravel Sale Agreements were assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc. 
possession of property is transferred but the 
seller retains the title as security for the 
payment of the price shall be deemed a sale. 
An even exchange of tangible personal 
properties shall not be deemed a sale for 
purposes of this act, but in any transaction 
wherein tangible personal property is taken 
as part of the sales price of other tangible 
personal property, the balance valued in 
money or other consideration shall be deemed 
a sale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(2) (1986). 
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which, thereafter, remained the owner of those Gravel Sale 
Agreements. (R. 208) 
Steven Goddard was controller of Petitioners before 
and after the reorganization and was solely responsible for 
establishing and operating all of the accounting systems and 
procedures for the newly organized corporations. (R. 208, 645) 
In developing those systems and procedures, Goddard allocated 
and assigned the assets of Harper Excavating, Inc. to each of 
the newly formed subsidiaries. (R. 208) For allocation 
purposes, Goddard assumed that the materials and costs 
associated with preparing sand and gravel should be allocated to 
Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. , that assets and costs of hauling 
the materials should be allocated to Harper Excavating, Inc., 
and that Harper Contracting, Inc. should be allocated the assets 
and costs associated with installing the materials. (R. 647; 
Transcript at 73-74, 77-78) Consistent with Goddard's theory of 
accounting after the reorganization, Goddard mistakenly assigned 
the gravel pit materials to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. (R. 
208-09) Goddard did not know that these assets had actually 
been assigned to Harper Contracting, Inc. and never consulted 
Rulon Harper regarding the appropriate allocation of the company 
assets. (R. 208-09; transcript at 77-78) 
All of Goddard' s subsequent accounting with respect to 
the sand and gravel was based upon his erroneous assignment of 
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those assets to Harper Sand and Gravel, Inc. (R. 209) Rulon 
Harper was not aware of Goddard' s misassignment of the sand and 
gravel assets and was also not aware that Goddard' s accounting 
records and procedures did not reflect the true ownership of the 
gravel pit materials. (R. 209) Petitioners did not discover 
the accounting discrepancies until Respondent' s audit in 1988. 
As a result of the audit, Petitioners caused their financial 
statements to be restated to accurately reflect the ownership of 
sand and gravel as well as the true nature of the transactions 
among the Petitioners. (Transcript at 83-84, 121-23; Exhibit 
12) 
It is undisputed that Respondent' s audit, which 
supports the assessment of the sales tax, was based solely upon 
Petitioners' erroneous accounting records. (R. 209-10, 315-370; 
transcript at 141-42) Therefore, in the hearing before the Tax 
Commission, Petitioners argued that the Commission must 
recognize the actual ownership of the sand and gravel materials 
and base its decision upon the true nature of the transactions 
which occurred between the Petitioners.8 To assist the Tax 
The Tax Commission apparently failed to understand the 
substance of Petitioners' argument. In its Final Decision, the 
Commission stated: 
In the present case, the Petitioner argued 
that one must look past the actual operation 
of the companies involved and practices in 
which they engaged, and look to where the 
legal ownership of the property in question 
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Commission, Petitioner submitted their restated financial 
statements to the Tax Commission. Those restated financials 
accurately reflected the true nature of the transactions between 
Petitioners. Significantly, Respondent' s only witness at the 
hearing indicated that the restated financials could possibly 
lead him to a different conclusion regarding the sales tax 
imposed. (Transcript at 144) In its Final Decision, however, 
the Tax Commission ignored Petitioners restated financial 
statements and affirmed the tax assessment against Petitioners. 
(R. 207-14) 
The Utah Sales and Use Tax Act does not specifically 
address the problem which exists in this case where the records 
of the taxpayer incorrectly record sales of personal property 
which have not in fact occurred. Therefore, this Court must 
actually laid. . . . The Commission does not 
accept Petitioner' s argument that the 
relationship of the three companies with 
respect to one another and the proper 
allocation of their assets determines sales 
tax liability without regard to the manner in 
which the assets were allocated (albeit in 
error) by the controller and the subsequent 
dealings between the companies as actually 
practiced. 
(R. 211) These statements misstate Petitioners' arguments. 
Petitioners never asked the Commission to look past their actual 
operations, but rather to look t& their actual operations and not 
to the erroneous accounting methods which purported to reflect 
those operations. 
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look to the legislative intent behind the statute. As this 
court has recently recognized, the 
primary responsibility in construing 
legislative enactments is to give effect to 
the legislature's underlying intent. "In 
determining the legislative intent of a 
statute, the statute should be considered 
in the light of the purpose it was designed 
to serve and so applied as to carry out that 
purpose if it can be done consistent with 
its language. ' " 
Savage Indus, v. State Tax Comm' n, 811 P. 2d 664, 671 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting Utah Power & Light v. Municipal Power Sys.. 784 P.2d 
137, 141 (Utah 1989) (quoting Johnson v. State Tax Comm' n, 17 
Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah 1977)). 
The purpose of the Sales and Use Tax Act is clearly to 
tax actual sales that occur within the state. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-103 (1987). The Tax Commission cannot seriously argue 
that the legislature intended taxes to be assessed on erroneous 
accounting records which fail to reflect the realities of the 
underlying transactions. As the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized, a taxpayers accounting records "are no more than 
evidential, being neither indispensable nor conclusive. The 
[tax] decision must rest upon actual facts." Doyle v. Mitchell 
Bros, Co. . 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1917). 
No Utah courts have addressed the issue being 
presented in this case. However, numerous courts from other 
jurisdictions have recognized that accounting records merely 
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record facts, they do not create the facts. See, e. a. , Welp v. 
United States, 201 F. 2d 128, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1953); 
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Huston, 126 F. 2d 196, 
199 (8th Cir. 1942); Sitterdina v. Commissioner, 80 F. 2d 939, 
940-41 (4th Cir. 1936). These courts reason, therefore, that 
taxes must be imposed upon actual facts and not upon erroneous 
accounting records. See, e. a. , Chicago, Burlington & Ouincy 
R. R. Co. v. United States, 455 F. 2d 993, 1016 (Ct. CI. 1972), 
rev/d on other grounds, 412 U.S. 401 (1973); Welp. 201 F. 2d at 
131; Northwestern States Portland Cement, 126 F. 2d at 199; 
Sitterding, 80 F. 2d at 941; Commissioner v. North Jersey Title 
Ins. Co. , 79 F. 2d 492, 493 (3rd Cir. 1935); Wood v. 
Commissioner, 93 T. C. 114, 120 (1989); Loftis v. Commissioner, 6 
B. T. A. 725, 728 (1927). 
There are obvious public policy reasons for requiring 
the Tax Commission to assess taxes upon underlying facts rather 
than upon erroneous accounting records and procedures. If 
accounting records and procedures determined a person' s tax 
liability, taxpayers would be encouraged to create an accounting 
method and paper trail which would result in favorable tax 
assessments despite the legal, jural or other actual operations 
of the taxpayer. A taxpayer' s incorrect accounting records and 
procedures will obviously not preclude the government from 
collecting its revenues. Sitterding. 80 F. 2d at 941. By the 
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same token, the taxpayer should not be bound by erroneous 
records and procedures which suggest a tax liability that does 
not otherwise exist. Id. 
Contrary to the decision of the Tax Commission, 
Petitioners did nothing which warranted a tax in this case. In 
fact, they conveyed title to the materials to Harper 
Contracting, Inc. specifically to avoid even the potential for 
any such tax. The mistake, in this case, was made by the 
controller who was unaware of the realities of the situation. 
When the mistake was discovered, Petitioners restated their 
financial records so that they accurately reflected the 
underlying transactions. 9 The decision of the Tax Commission 
should have been based upon the facts as accurately reflected in 
Petitioners restated financial statements because the 
legislature intended to tax actual sales rather than inaccurate 
records of non-existent sales. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the decision of the Tax Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners analyzed the provisions of the Utah Sales 
and Use Tax Act and reasonably concluded that they were a "group 
It is significant to note that Respondent audited 
Petitioners' accounting records for the period 1/1/89 to 9/30/91. 
Those records accurately reflect the transactions which have 
continued to occur between Petitioners since they were reorganized 
in May of 1986. Respondent' s audit did not result in any 
assessment of sales tax for the sand and gravel transactions 
between Petitioners. 
-33-
or combination acting as a unit" within the meaning of the Act. 
Therefore, they filed consolidated tax returns eliminating 
intra-unit accounting entries. The Tax Commission concluded, 
however, that although Petitioners were a unit for purposes of 
filing consolidated sales tax returns under the Utah Sales and 
Use Tax Act, that status did not entitle them to disregard 
intra-unit transactions for payment of sales tax. Unlike the 
decision of the Tax Commission, Petitioners' interpretation of 
the Act is reasonable, logical and provides a consistent 
application to the phrase "group or combination acting as a 
unit. " Petitioners should not be penalized because they acted 
upon their reasonable interpretation of the Act. Consequently, 
this Court should reverse the decision of the Tax Commission and 
order the Commission to refund the amounts paid by Petitioners 
under protest plus the interest that has accrued thereon. 
The Court need not address Petitioners second argument 
unless it fails to rule in Petitioners' favor on their first 
argument. Even then, the Court must reverse the decision of the 
Tax Commission because it fails to recognize and assess taxes 
according to the facts in this case. It is undisputed that 
Harper Contracting, Inc. owned the sand and gravel which was 
transferred to it from Harper Excavating, Inc. Therefore, the 
transactions which occurred between those Petitioners could not 
have been sales within the meaning of the Utah Sales and Use Tax 
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Act and Petitioners' accounting records which mis characterized 
those transactions as sales were erroneous. The Tax Commission 
should have relied upon the actual facts rather than upon the 
Petitioners' erroneous recording of those facts. Therefore, the 
Court must reverse the decision of the Tax Commission and order 
the Commission to refund the amounts paid by Petitioners under 
protest plus the interest that has accrued thereon. 
DATED this L day October, 1992. 
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